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Fearsome risks are those that stimulate strong emotional responses. Such risks, which 
usually involve high consequences, tend to have low probabilities, since life today is no 
longer nasty, brutish and short. In the face of a low-probability fearsome risk, people 
often exaggerate the benefits of preventive, risk-reducing, or ameliorative measures. In 
both personal life and politics, the result is damaging overreactions to risks. We offer 
evidence for the phenomenon of probability neglect, failing to distinguish between high 
and low-probability risks. Action bias is a likely result. 
 
 
1.  The problem and the Thesis 
 
When risks threaten, some cognitive mechanisms push people toward action; others push 
them toward inaction. The availability heuristic can do either. When relevant events are 
cognitively available, people will be inclined to act; availability bias might lead them to value the 
risk excessively and thereby take excessive precautions. But if relevant events are not available, 
the unavailability bias will predominate. The risk will be slighted, and action will be inhibited.  
Most of the literature on individual and social responses to risks stresses the inaction 
case, and focuses on the need to develop mechanisms to ensure that serious dangers receive 
sufficient response. President Roosevelt’s concerns about fear, expressed in his very next words, 
were: “nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat 
into advance.” Roosevelt was right to see that this “paralysis” phenomenon is important. But 
because cognitive biases also push in the opposite direction, producing overreactions or what we 2 
might think of as panic, mechanisms are also needed to dampen public demands and policy 
responses. Panic and passivity are the opposite ends of a spectrum. Each is unwelcome.  
This essay focuses on fearsome risks—those that stimulate strong emotional responses, 
such as fear and anxiety.
1 Such risks, which usually involve high consequences, tend to have 
extremely low probabilities, since life today is no longer nasty, brutish and short. We aim to 
show here that in the face of a fearsome risk, people often exaggerate the benefits of preventive, 
risk-reducing, or ameliorative measures. In both personal life and politics, the result is damaging 
overreactions to risks. In this essay, we focus on a form of decision bias that goes by the name of 
probability neglect.  
Probabilities perplex people. Puny probabilities prove particularly perplexing. When risk 
probabilities are extremely low, as they are for most high-consequence negative events, those 
who fall victim to probability neglect will give up too much to avoid the risk. Frequently, they 
will take excessive preventive action.
2  This will be true of governments and corporations as well 
as individuals, in part because they respond to individuals, in part because of their own 
tendencies.   
One salient manifestation of probability neglect is that in two situations involving the 
same fearsome risk, one much more likely than the other, individuals may value risk elimination 
little differently even though probabilities may differ by a factor of 20 or more. The reason is that 
they focus on the bad outcome itself, and they are inattentive to the question of how likely it is to 
occur—hence their overreaction when the risk is low. Such overreactions in general can be 
categorized as “action bias.” That bias is especially likely if the relevant actors will be able to 
obtain credit for responding to the risk. That credit may come from themselves or from the 
public more generally (Patt and Zeckhauser, 2000). 
An understanding of action bias in the context of low-probability risks, and its common 
ingredient probability neglect, has important implications for both law and policy. It is 
predictable that in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, the public will both alter its behavior and 
demand a substantial governmental response. That will be true even if the magnitude of the risk 
does not warrant such a response, and even if the danger is far less than that presented by other 
hazards that do not greatly concern people, perhaps because they do not get much public 
attention. Consider, for example, the possibility that extensive security precautions at airports 
will lead people to drive rather than to fly; because flying is much safer than driving, such 
precautions might sacrifice many lives on balance. The monies spent in recent years on airplane 
security might be out of scale with the level of risk reduction produced, particularly since 
numerous tests have found that the screening routinely fails to find weapons.  
Perhaps such screening, however low the risk or ineffective the preventive, does fulfill 
the function of reassuring the public. If so, it serves a positive function, not unlike the nighttime 
hoof clops of mounted police. Squad cars may be better at deterring or catching criminals, but do 
                                                 
1 The “risk as feelings” hypothesis highlights the “role of affect experienced at the moment of decision making,” 
(Loewenstein et al, 2001, p. 267), as opposed to a cognitive assessment of a risk.  
2 The converse is surely true. If emotions lead to the neglect of probabilities, there will be insufficient response to 
high probability risks. 3 
much less to reduce public anxiety. Hoof clops are splendid as a fear placebo. The same points 
apply of course to many other purported forms of risk reduction, including measures to prevent 
financial crises, local steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and regulation of abandoned 
hazardous waste dumps. Financial crises have a distinctive element: fear-related emotions 
themselves may stimulate the crisis, as in 2008, making reassurance that much more critical.  
In the personal as opposed to social domain, we can find many analogues, as when 
people alter their travel plans to avoid slight risks of crime, restructure their portfolios to avoid 
small risks of big financial losses, or change their diet to avoid de minimis health risks. In all of 
these cases, a form of action bias, fueled by probability neglect, may lead to overreactions. The 
costs of overreaction may be financial (restructuring the portfolio), increased risk (driving rather 
than flying), or sacrificed pleasure (children foregoing Halloween due to extremely rare razor-
blade incidents).  
 
2. Demonstrating Probability Neglect 
 
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) tells us that the perceived benefits of risk 
elimination will be much less than proportional to the risk avoided, since the probability 
weighting function takes a downward leap at 0. However, prospect theory alone gives no 
indication that the ratio of valuations would change dramatically with the nature of a risk, or with 
how it was described.  
Experiments on probability neglect seek to assess whether attention to probability could 
be overshadowed by attention to the affective goodness or badness of the outcome, quite 
contrary to what leading theories of decision making posit. To make the same point in broader 
and more metaphorical terms, emotional activity dampens cognitive activity. Loewenstein and 
Lerner (2003) observe that: “As the intensity of immediate emotions intensifies, they 
progressively take control of decision making and override rational decision making.” We would 
expand this assertion to include overriding well-documented behavioral patterns in decision 
making, such as those described by prospect theory. If such overshadowing or “taking control” is 
found, then a dire risk could swamp or at least temper the importance of dramatic probability 
differences.  
Some of the relevant experiments explore whether varying the probability of harm would 
matter less in settings that trigger strong emotions than in those that are relatively emotion-free. 
One such study explored people’s willingness to pay to avoid electric shocks, in an effort to test 
the relevance of variations in probability to “affect rich” decisions (Rottenstreich and Hsee, 
2001). In the “strong emotion” setting, participants were asked to imagine that they would 
participate in an experiment involving some chance of a “short, painful, but not dangerous 
electric shock.” In the relatively emotion-free setting, they were told that the experiment entailed 
some chance of a $20 penalty. Participants were asked to say how much they would be willing to 
pay to avoid participating in the relevant experiment. Some participants were told that there was 4 
a 1% chance of receiving the bad outcome (either the $20 loss or the electric shock); others were 
told that the chance was 99%.  
The central result was that variations in probability affected those facing the relatively 
emotion-free injury, the $20 penalty, far more than they affected people facing the more 
emotionally evocative outcome of an electric shock. For the cash penalty, the difference between 
the median payment for a 1% chance and the median payment for a 99% chance was predictably 
large. The median subject paid $1 to avoid a 1% chance, and $18 to avoid a 99% chance. For the 
electric shock, by contrast, the difference in probability made little difference to median 
willingness to pay: $7 to avoid a 1% chance, and $10 to avoid a 99% chance—only 1½ as much 
in the affect-rich setting as opposed to 18 times as much when little emotion was involved. (Of 
course, a fully rational response would produce a ratio much greater than 18, since income 
effects are likely trivial for such small gambles.)  
The conclusion is that when a hazard stirs strong emotions, most people will pay an 
amount to avoid it that varies little even with extreme differences in the starting probability. 
What we are stressing here is that when the probability of loss is very low, people will show 
action bias. They will favor precautionary steps even if those steps are not justified by any 
plausible analysis of expected utility.  
For either social or personal risks, the implication is clear. When the potential loss is 
likely to trigger strong emotions, action bias threatens, as it does when the loss is an economic 
meltdown, environmental catastrophe, terrorist attack, contracting cancer, or getting killed in a 
plane crash. Even if the likelihood of a terrible outcome were extremely low, people would be 
willing to pay a great deal to avoid it, whether through public or private action. Once a risk is in 
people’s minds, their willingness to pay to avoid it will often be relatively impervious to 
significant changes in probability. The significant and often expensive precautions taken against 
possible sniper attacks by citizens of the Washington, DC area in October 2002 provide a 
dramatic example; they attest to the phenomenon of probability neglect in the face of a vivid 
threat. Indeed, some of these precautions, such as driving great distances to a gas station in 
Virginia, almost certainly increased mortality risks on balance.
3  
Probability neglect and hence action bias can be found for willingness to reduce, and not 
merely to eliminate, a risk. To be sure, prospect theory shows that people will pay a special 
premium to eliminate a risk, but where the risk is emotionally gripping, risk reduction will not be 
sensitive to the question of probability. To investigate the possibility of value inflation in 
response to risks, we asked a large number of law students to state their maximum willingness to 
pay to reduce levels of arsenic in drinking water. The questions were drawn from real life. They 
were based on actual choices recently confronting the Environmental Protection Agency, 
involving cost and benefit information within the ballpark of actual figures used by the agency 
itself.  
                                                 
3 When the risk is imposed by malicious people, there is often a negative externality from the precautions taken by 
any individual. Those who went to Virginia to fill made it more dangerous for D.C. fillers. When few citizens walk 
in an urban area at night, those who still walk find such activity more dangerous. 5 
Participants were randomly sorted into four groups, representing the four conditions in a 
2x2 experiment, where both the probability and the description of the risk varied. In the first 
condition, people were asked to state their maximum willingness to pay to eliminate a cancer risk 
of one in 1,000,000. In the second condition, people were asked to state their maximum 
willingness to pay to eliminate a cancer risk of one in 100,000. In the third condition, people 
were asked the first question, but the cancer was described in vivid terms, as “very gruesome and 
intensely painful, as the cancer eats away at the internal organs of the body.” In the fourth 
condition, people were asked the second question, but the cancer was described in the same vivid 
terms as in the third condition. In each condition, participants were asked to check off their 
willingness to pay among the following options: $0, $25, $50, $100, $200, $400, and $800 or 
more. Notice that the description of the cancer in the “highly emotional” conditions added little 
information, simply describing many cancer deaths, though admittedly some participants might 
well have learned that these were especially horrific deaths.
4 
The first hypothesis, consistent with the probability weighting function of prospect 
theory, was that the ten-fold difference in probabilities—between 1/100,000 and 1/1,000,000—
would generate a much less than a ten-fold difference in willingness to pay. The second 
hypothesis was that the probability variations would matter less in the highly emotional 
conditions than in the less emotional conditions. More specifically, it was predicted that the 
highly emotional conditions would overshadow differences in probability, whereas such 
differences would have greater importance in the less emotional condition.  
Here are the results in tabular form: 
 
Table 1. Willingness to Pay in Dollars for Elimination of Arsenic Risks 
Harvard Law School Results, 2008 
Mean (Median) 
[Number of Subjects] 
 
Probability  Unemotional Description  Emotional Description 
1/100,000  241.25 (100)  
[20] 
250 (100) 
[13] 
1/1,000,000  59.21 (25) 
[19] 
211.67 (200) 
[15] 
    
The study was conducted in two law school venues, University of Chicago (Sunstein, 
2002) and at Harvard Law School. At Chicago, the medians were 25 and 100 for the unemotional 
description, and 100 and 100 for the emotional description. While the sample size was too small 
to permit firm conclusions, the qualitative results pointed in the hypothesized direction. The 
emotional description drove out responses to the quantitative difference in the risk. 
                                                 
4 Paul Slovic stressed to us that individuals cannot experience fear over a sustained period of time. However, we 
believe that our questions spotlight a risk, and do have the potential to stir severe emotions as individuals respond.  6 
At Harvard, as shown and hypothesized, the valuations for the emotional description 
hardly differed even though risks differed by a factor of 10. There was substantial difference in 
willingness to pay (WTP) for the unemotional description. A Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon Rank 
Sum test showed that the WTP was actually higher for the 1/1,000,000 risk given the emotional 
description, though far from significant. By contrast, and as expected, the difference for the 
emotional description was highly significant, with the 1/100,000 payment higher (z = 3.398, p < 
0.001). Comparing the two results showed that the unemotional description gave a greater 
differential that was highly statistically significant. 
It is important to note that the difference in WTP, even for the unemotional description, 
was far below the 10 to 1 odds ratio; for means it was roughly 4 to 1. Both hypotheses were 
therefore supported. First, varying the probability had an effect on WTP that was much less than 
rational decision theory would predict. (Future research should assess whether even mentioning 
the word “cancer” induced sufficient emotion to reduce a 10 to 1 ratio to 4 to 1.) Second, the 
effect of increasing the probability by a factor of ten had an effect that was highly significant in 
the unemotional condition—but was completely insignificant in the emotional condition. When 
the cancer was described in affectively gripping terms, people were insensitive to probability 
variations.  
These findings have two implications for overreactions. They suggest, first, that when 
extremely low probability risks give rise to intense fear, they are likely to trigger a larger 
behavioral response than do statistically identical comparisons involving less fearsome risks. 
Here, as in the experiment, there will be a kind of “emotion premium.” The findings suggest, 
second, that probability neglect will play a role in the private and public reaction to emotionally 
gripping risks, and that many people will focus, much of the time, on the emotionally perceived 
severity of the outcome, rather than on its likelihood. In this light, it should not be surprising that 
our public figures and our cause advocates often describe tragic outcomes. Rarely do we here 
them quote probabilities. The latter, even if reasonably large, would have little salience in the 
public debate.  
Think of an anti-drunk driving campaign that said: “When you drink don’t drive; you 
have one chance in 1,000,000 of getting into a fatal car crash, a much higher probability than 
most people believe.”
5 The alternative campaign, catering to probability neglect, would skip 
probabilities altogether. It might show a car wrapped around a tree, and a grieving family 
standing nearby, with the simple statement: “When you drink don’t drive.” The tree-wrap, we 
predict, would be more effective. 
Emotions not connected to fear may also drive probability neglect. Consider outrage, an 
emotion sometimes stirred when low probability risks are created from the outside, as they are 
with nuclear waste radiation. A similar risk from radon exposure comes from one’s own 
basement, hence no outrage. Outrage can overshadow probabilities in much the same way as a 
vivid risk can, reinforcing our metaphor about emotional activity dampening cognitive activity. 
                                                 
5 This number was roughly calculated assuming that there are 100 million drivers, each driving after drinking 15 
days a year, and accounting for half the annual fatalities in the United States.  7 
A central finding of relevant empirical work is consistent with that stressed here: a large 
difference in probability had no effect on people’s judgments in a “high outrage” condition, 
involving nuclear waste, but a significant effect in a “low outrage” condition, involving radon. 
For nuclear waste, people responded the same way to a risk of 1 in 100,000 as to a risk of 1 in 
1,000,000 (Sandman et al., 1998). Even when both the statistical risk and ultimate consequences 
were identical in the high outrage (nuclear waste) and low outrage (radon) cases, people in the 
nuclear waste case reported a much greater perceived threat and a much higher intention to act to 
reduce that threat (id.). Indeed, “the effect of outrage was practically as large as the effect of a 
4000-fold difference in risk between the high-risk and low-risk conditions” (id.).
6  
In this light, it is not surprising that visualization or imagery matters a great deal to 
people’s reactions to risks. Vivid images can produce palpable overreactions (Slovic et al., 
2000). When an image of a bad outcome is easily accessible, people will become greatly 
concerned about a risk, holding probability constant (Loewenstein et al., 2001). An interesting 
anomaly is that when people are asked how much they will pay for flight insurance for losses 
resulting from “terrorism,” they will pay more than if they are asked how much they will pay for 
flight insurance from all causes (Johnson et al., 1993).
7 The likely explanation for this peculiar 
result is that the word “terrorism” evokes vivid images of disaster, outrage, or both, thus 
inhibiting judgments about probability differences. Note also that when people discuss a low-
probability risk, their concern rises even if the discussion consists mostly of apparently 
trustworthy assurances that the likelihood of harm really is infinitesimal (Alkahami and Slovic, 
1994). The discussion helps people to visualize the risk, thus making it more frightening. The 
most sensible conclusion is that with respect to risks of injury or harm, vivid images and 
concrete pictures of disaster can “crowd out” the cognitive activity require to conclude and 
consider the fact that the probability of disaster is really small. 
 
3. Probability Neglect and Anxiety  
 
We also sought to test the relationship between probability neglect and the emotion of 
anxiety. In order to do so, we followed Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001), who used a painful but 
not dangerous electric shock to produce emotion and presumably anxiety. In a subsequent class, 
the authors asked the same class of Harvard Law School students how much they would demand 
to accept a shock. If their demand price was below the experimenter’s payment price, the 
experiment would go ahead at the experimenter’s price, thus assuring incentive compatibility. 
                                                 
6 An alternative explanation is that individuals demand substantial compensation for their outrage, and that such 
compensation is both fairly independent of the probability and large relative to the compensation for risk. Note that 
efforts to communicate the meaning of differences in risk levels, by showing comparisons to normal risk levels, 
reduced the effect of outrage; but only modestly so. Outrage had nearly the same effect as a 2000-fold increase in 
risk (id.). Did this information provision improve cognitive uptake directly, or indirectly because it dampened the 
outrage? Further experiments will be required to tell. 
7 This should bring to mind a component of the embeddedness phenomenon known for contingent valuation. If seals 
are appealing and easily visualized, it is not surprising that we might pay more to save them in an oil spill than to 
save all wildlife. 8 
This too was a 2x2 setup, with the probability and the timing of the shock each taking two 
values. The shock was either received for certain (100% probability) or with 1% probability. The 
shock was to be delivered immediately after class, or immediately after a class one year from the 
experiment. Unlike the arsenic study, the categories of payment were not predefined. Not 
surprisingly, the mean values substantially exceeded the medians due to a few severe outliers.   
It was conjectured that contemplating receiving the shock in a year would raise anxiety 
beyond that of waiting to receive a potential shock at the end of class. Such anxiety, it was 
thought, might enhance probability neglect. It could also raise the demand price.  
There were three hypotheses to be tested. They would be tested using rank order, 
nonparametric methods.  
1. Subjects would show probability neglect. The differences in demand prices in the 
certainty condition and 1% chance condition would be far less than 100 to 1.  
2. The contemplation period for receiving a shock in a year would increase the total costs 
of anxiety. Because people would want to reduce their own anxiety, the demand price would be 
higher for the shock to be delivered a year from today.  
If hypothesis 2 was confirmed, a third hypothesis would be relevant. 
3. Given that probability neglect is greater in emotionally gripping cases, the disparity 
between the certainty price and the 1% price would be more compressed for the shock to be 
received in a year (thus multiplying anxiety) that from the shock to be received today.  
The results were as follows:    
 
 
The first hypothesis, most important to our central claim here, was confirmed. There was 
nothing even close to a statistically significant difference between the certainty price and 1% 
conditions in both the Shock Today and Shock in a Year cases. Despite a 100 times greater 
chance of getting a shock, people demanded to be paid no more to receive it.
8  
The second hypothesis was rejected. Moreover, there was not close to statistical 
significance in the difference between the price in a year and the price today for either 
                                                 
8 The contrast with the Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) results is instructive. Their study differed in two significant 
ways: (1) They asked willingness-to-pay rather than willingness-to-accept. They got much lower median values, 
namely $7 and $19.86. (They also tried a median of $10 for a 99% chance of a shock.) (2) They did not use an 
incentive-compatible procedure. Hence, their values may be low for strategic reasons.  
Table 2. Demand Price to Accept a Painful but Nondangerous Electric Shock 
Harvard Law School Results, 2008 
Mean (Median) 
[Number of Subjects] 
Probability  Shock Today  Shock in a Year (Anxiety) 
100%  1283.33 (50)     
[12]                      
1966.43 (100) 
[14] 
1%  661.41 (50)        
 [23]                   
824.05 (50) 
[21] 9 
probability. This rendered the third hypothesis moot; moreover, no statistically significant 
difference was found in either direction.  
What explains the rejection of the second hypothesis? It is conceivable that the mere 
thought of a shock is sufficient to induce an emotional state, and that in light of that thought, 
subjects were not influenced by either time lapses or by probability. Note that standard theory 
might predict that people would discount the future and hence be more willing to pay to avoid an 
imminent shock than a future one; though we hypothesized the opposite, it is noteworthy that 
there was no discounting of an adverse event in the future. It is also possible that although 
anxiety induces emotion directly, anxiety about anxiety is much less powerful. That is, 
individuals may have a difficult time thinking about their loss from being anxious. Future 
experiments might examine the role of anxiety as an emotion-inducing experience in the period 
before an unfavorable lottery is resolved. 
 
 
4. The Demand for and Supply of Law 
 
If probability neglect characterizes individual judgment under certain circumstances, 
government and law are likely to be neglecting probability under those same circumstances. If 
people show unusually strong reactions to low-probability catastrophes, a democratic 
government is likely to act accordingly, either because it is responding to the public, or because 
its officials suffer the same proclivities. Recall that if government actors are able to claim credit 
for acting, or if they would be blamed for not acting, the likelihood of action bias increases (Patt 
and Zeckhauser, 2000). We suspect that in many domains, government responses to emotionally 
gripping problems with low probability of occurrence can be explained in this way. (See 
Hamilton and Viscusi, 1999, for examples.) We also suspect that ill-considered, future, or 
counterproductive reactions to past, present, or imminent risks derive in part from this 
phenomenon. 
In the environmental area, there has been an intense debate about whether the National 
Environmental Policy Act requires agencies to discuss the worst-case scenario in environmental 
impact statements. Environmental groups sought to ensure discussion of that scenario. They did 
so in part to stimulate public concern, with the knowledge that the worst case might well have a 
great deal of salience, however unlikely it might be. For its part, the government originally 
required discussion of the worst case, but changed in its mind, with the apparent understanding 
that people are too likely to overreact. Hence the current approach, upheld by the Supreme 
Court,
9 requires consideration of low-probability events, but only if they are not entirely remote 
and speculative.  
                                                 
9 Robertson v. Mathow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 354-56 (1989). 10 
At least at first glance, the current approach, and the Supreme Court’s decision, seem 
entirely reasonable.
10 (On some of the complexities here, see Sunstein, 2007.) If the chance that 
the worst case will come to fruition is truly miniscule, it is plausible to say that it need not be 
discussed in environmental impact statements, for the principal effect of the discussion would be 
to activate fear, which is by hypothesis unwarranted by the facts. Worst-case analysis should not 
apply when accumulated evidence shows that risks are quite low, as say with a major asteroid 
hitting the Earth in the next year. Yet in the context of terrorism and other emotionally laden 
hazards, people neglect the role of probability even when the evidence suggests that the 
probability is quite small (Rothchild, 2001). 
A good deal of legislation and regulation can be explained partly by reference to the 
neglect of low probabilities when emotions are running high. Consider a few examples
11: 
 
  In the aftermath of news report about emotionally gripping adverse health effects 
allegedly caused by abandoned hazardous waste in Love Canal, the government 
responded with an aggressive program for cleaning up abandoned hazardous waste cites, 
without closely examining the probability that illness and other harm would actually 
occur. In fact little was accomplished by early efforts to assure people of the low 
probability of harm (Kuran and Sunstein, 1999). When the local health department 
publicized controlled studies showing little evidence of adverse effects, the publicity did 
not dampen concern, because the numbers “had no meaning”
 (Gibbs, 1998). In fact the 
numbers seemed to aggravate fear: “One woman, divorced and with three sick children, 
looked at the piece of paper with numbers and started crying hysterically: ‘No wonder my 
children are sick. Am I going to die? What’s going to happen to my children?’” (id.). 
Questions of this sort contributed to the enactment of new legislation to control 
abandoned hazardous waste sites, legislation that did not embody careful consideration of 
the probability of significant health or environmental benefits (Kuran and Sunstein, 
1999). Even now, law and policy are affected by interest group pressures and public 
alarm; the government has sometimes neglected the probability of significant harm in 
making clean-up decisions (Hamilton and Viscusi, 1998). 
  During a highly publicized campaign designed to show a connection between Alar, a 
pesticide, and cancer in children, the public demand for action was not much affected by 
the EPA’s cautionary notes about the low probability of getting that disease (Wildavsky, 
1995). The mere idea that children might die, as a result of apple consumption, had a 
significant effect on behavior, with probabilistic information seeming not to reduce 
people’s fears.  
                                                 
10 Jon Elster has explored the possibility that the worst-case analysis still should be employed as a maximin 
approach when the probabilities of the various outcomes cannot be assessed (Elster, 1983). Dyed-in-the-wool 
Bayesians, by contrast, would say that subjective probabilities should still be assessed and used. 
11 In pointing to the role of probability neglect in these cases, we do not mean to reach any final conclusion on what 
the government ought to have done in any of them.  11 
  In the fall of 2001, vivid images of summer shark attacks created a public outcry about 
new risks for ocean swimmers. This was so notwithstanding the exceedingly low 
probability of a shark attack, and the absence of any reliable evidence of an increase in 
shark attacks in the summer of 2001. Predictably, there was considerable discussion of 
new legislation to control the problem, and eventually such legislation was enacted in 
Florida. Public fears and anxieties were not impervious to the fact that the underlying risk 
was miniscule; but the emotional response greatly exceeded the statistical risk. 
  The Three-Mile Island accident had significant adverse effects on nuclear power in the 
United States for a long period, even though a blue ribbon panel concluded that the 
expected number of lives lost was less than 1.  
 
With respect to terrorism, the anthrax scare of October, 2001, which grew out of 
exceedingly few incidents, provides dramatic evidence. Only four people died of the infection; 
only about a dozen others fell ill. The probability of being infected was exceedingly low. 
Nonetheless, anxiety proliferated; people focused their attention on the outcome rather than the 
extremely low probability of the harm. The government responded accordingly, investing 
significant resources in ensuring against anthrax infections. Private institutions reacted the same 
way, asking people to take extraordinary care in opening the mail even though the statistical risks 
were tiny.  
In any particular case, such as anthrax, it is hard to say that precautions were excessive. 
This could be hindsight bias. Maybe we just got lucky that there was not some large anthrax 
conspiracy. But if we look across dozens of cases, we can observe a pattern in which salient but 
extremely low probability risks are sometimes met with excessive responses. We should reiterate 
our horse-clop point made earlier. If the preventive measures significantly assuage public fears, 
perhaps they are worthwhile even if they reduce risk little if at all. But in some cases, we suspect 
that to the contrary, some such measures stir rather than reduce fears by making the threat 
salient. Think of posting a police officer at the doors of college buildings to protect against 
campus shootings. 
Arguably, the most severe recent example of overreaction to a risk threat is the follow-on 
to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Public fears and anxieties helped to produce the 
Iraq War, and to private and public costs that were orders of magnitude higher than the costs of 
the attacks themselves. A full explanation of the Iraq War would of course have to include a 
number of factors, but any such explanation would point, in part, to action bias and probability 
neglect.  
What might be done, recognizing the widespread tendency toward overreaction to 
emotional risks? We do not have the space to answer fully, but with respect to regulatory policy, 
institutional safeguards are the best way of ensuring against the harmful consequences of 
probability neglect. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, within the Office of 
Management and Budget, monitors agency action to ensure that it is directed against genuinely 
significant problems. A general requirement of cost-benefit balancing, with careful attention to 
the best estimates of relevant probabilities, should provide a check on regulations that deviate 12 
substantially from objective evidence, providing far too little risk reduction for the resources 
required. (Such requirements should also provide an impetus to preventive measures that the 
public might not seek.) Reduction in public fears should count, but they are not a trump card. If 
government wants to protect against hysterical precautions, analytic requirements and 
institutional checks will provide a start.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Our central goal here has been to understand overreactions to fearsome risks. We have 
suggested that when risks are vivid, people are likely to be insensitive to the probability of harm, 
particularly when their emotions are activated.
12 If terrible outcomes are easy to visualize, large-
scale changes in thought and behavior are to be expected, even if the statistical risks are 
dramatically lower than those associated with many activities where the stakes are equivalent but 
do not raise public concern. This claim about action bias helps explain public overreaction to 
certain highly publicized, low-probability risks, including those posed by sniper attacks, 
abandoned hazardous waste dumps, anthrax, and perhaps terrorism more generally. With 
financial crises, as late 2008 made tragically clear, fears and anxieties, and the action bias they 
induce, may dramatically magnify both the likelihood and size of a severe adverse outcome.  
It follows that government regulation, affected as it is by the public demand for law, is 
likely to stumble on the challenge of low probability harms as well. The government should not 
swiftly capitulate if the public is demonstrating action bias and showing an excessive response to 
a risk whose expected value is quite modest. A critical component of government response 
should be information and education. But if public fear remains high, the government should 
determine which measures can reduce most cost effectively, almost in the spirit of looking for 
the best “fear placebo.” Valued attributes for such measures will be high visibility, low cost, and 
perceived effectiveness. Reducing fear offers two major benefits: (1) Fear itself imposes 
significant costs. (2) Both private and public responses in the face of fearsome risks are likely to 
be far from rational. These observations lead to the difficult questions of how to monetize and 
reduce public fear. The answers lie well beyond the current topic. 
 
                                                 
12 In future work, we expect to examine the complementary concept of payoff neglect: when emotions run high the 
size of potential losses will tend to be slighted. The emotion may be stimulated by anger due to the source of the 
risk, or merely a vivid description of the risk itself, apart from its magnitude.  13 
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